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FROM THE BEGINNING, A FUNDAMENTAL 
SHIFf OF PARADIGMS: A THEORY 
AND SHORT HISTORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Looking back on the past twenty-five years, during which environ-
mental law has developed such astonishing breadth, depth, and volume, I 
think it possible to sketch out an interesting compound proposition about 
how environmental law evolved, the primacy of citizen litigation in its 
development, and what it all may signify. 
How is it that environmental law has in short order built such a 
large body of law, covering so many diverse subjects and infiltrating itself 
throughout the prior existing legal system, as well as creating new law? I 
propose that it is because environmental law has been riding a wave of 
structural change formed by the conjunction of two fundamental para-
digm shifts in American society. The proposition has two parts. 
First, the basic analytical approach and policy values underlying en-
vironmentallaw came from a fundamental paradigm shift born of Rachel 
Carson in 1961, perhaps assisted unwittingly by Ronald Coase, redefin-
ing the scope of how societal governance decisions should be made. I 
© 1994 by Zygmunt J.B. Plater. 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A fuller version of this Essay and some 
overall analyses and conclusions drawn from the proposition presented here, can be found in 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future-Tracing the Consequences 
of a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). I 
much appreciate the time that my colleagues Rob Abrams, Carolyn Alkire, Harry Bader, John 
Kelleher, John Morrier, Pat Ratkowski, and Bill Shutkin have given me, gOOd-naturedly put-
ting up with brainstorming sessions and trying to correct the Essay's most egregious errors. 
They bear no blame, however, for deficiencies that remain. 
1. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most important single trigger of the 
environmental great awakening, the scientific treatise that brought ecological consciousness 
into the American mainstream. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Professor 
Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost, although a paean to market ordering, served to 
popularize recognition of social cost externalizations. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Welfare economics presumes that individuals are 
powerfully motivated to externalize costs as much as possible, and cost externalizations have 
long been the prime targets for environmental law's accounting process. Id. 
981 
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What we might call the Rachel Carson Paradigm2 declared that, 
although humans naturally try to maximize their own accumulation of 
benefits and ignore negative effects of their actions, a society that wishes 
to survive and prosper must identify and take comprehensive account of 
the real interacting consequences of individual decisions, negative as well 
as positive, whether the marketplace accounts for them or not. Attempts 
to achieve such expanded accountings, as much as anything, have been 
the common thread linking the remarkable range of issues that we call 
environmental law. 
Rachel Carson's logic is practical, utilitarian advice. Not to heed it, 
allowing private and public enterprises to act as if they are unconnected 
islands, where out of sight is out of mind, means that a society risks a 
short- and long-term shipwreck on the shoals of its own detritus-not 
just an accumulation of toxics, but also a host of other social costs and 
unintended consequences. 3 
A second, structural paradigm shift from the mid-1960s has also 
been critically important to the formation of American environmental 
law: the shift in the structure of governance from a bipolar, Market/ 
Regulatory Government Paradigm to a multipolar, actively Pluralist 
Mode1.4 Environmental law has been, and had to be, predominantly cre-
ated and shaped by active citizens, operating from positions outside offi-
cial private and public governing institutions. 
The Rachel Carson Paradigm and environmental consciousness for-
tuitously hit America at the same moment as this second paradigm shift. 
If the utilitarian message of the Carson analytical construct was to be 
2. See infra text accompanying note 66. It alternatively and more awkwardly might be 
called the Holistic Interconnected-Accounting Paradigm in honor of the First Law of Ecology: 
Everything is connected to everything else. 
Just as others, such as John Muir, had foreshadowed Carson's ecological arguments, the 
logic of comprehensive societal accounting was a familiar theme in the work of John Dewey 
and the pragmatists, as well as an underlying premise of welfare economics. 
Indeed, the Rachel Carson Paradigm is obvious, virtually a truism. Truism or not, how-
ever, it was generally ignored as a functional societal policy. Carson's formulation, however, 
had broad popular and political impact and instantly clicked with a wide range of people who 
wanted to take action in the field that came to be known as environmentalism. Perhaps the 
environmental problems she identified were more tangible, directly related to things people 
saw around them. Perhaps her formulation made coherent critical analysis available to more 
people and offered more coherent prescriptive corrections. Perhaps it just came at the right 
time. And insofar as the identification of the Carson Paradigm is itself a truism, it seems to be 
one that usefully deserves more attention in ongoing analysis of environmental fact and policy. 
3. Or, in welfare economics terms, unaccounted, externalized costs lead to society-wide 
suboptimal results. 
4. Looking for a patronymic label, I suppose one could call this the "Thomas Jefferson-
Mao Tse-Tung-Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom-Pluralist Paradigm," but under the circum-
stances perhaps it is just as well to say the Pluralist Paradigm. 
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carried into the society's long-term perspective and the structures of gov-
ernment, reorienting the way decisions are made, it was not to be ex-
pected that the old bipolar establishments of the status quo would 
welcome it-nor have they. A diverse array of interests, most of which 
are "outsiders," had to thrust it into the legal system. More than any 
other area of the modem legal system, environmental law has developed 
its complex, extended, doctrinal structure in a process dependent upon 
confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism, operating in every area of 
governance, but particularly in judicial and administrative litigation. 
Although one should not be oblivious to some caveats--environ-
mental law can be chaotic and wasteful, citizens did not do it all, and so 
onS-this compound analytical and structural proposition helps explain 
why the field of environmental law has been so energetic, broad-ranging, 
and often confrontational. It also explains where environmental law may 
be going. 
II. A DIAGNOSTIC EXAMPLE: SECTION 318(G) OF THE 1990 
INTERIOR ApPROPRIATIONS ACT 
Here is one recent artifact of environmental law's evolutionary pro-
cess6 that reflects many classic elements of environmental confrontation 
and provides illustration and analytical grist for the proposition. Section 
318(g) of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropria-
5. To assert citizen primacy runs the risk of ignoring the protracted and sometimes he-
roic efforts of hundreds of people within the nation's legislatures, administrative agencies, and 
corporate institutions who undeniably have been extremely important in shaping the substance 
and character of evolving doctrines of environmental law. But a review of the history of envi-
ronmentallaw shows grounds for asserting that without insistent citizen activism, this process 
of law building would probably never have happened or would have died aborning. The devel-
opment of environmental law is especially significant for the process by which it has occurred 
as well as the importance of its subject matter. 
A further caveat is that environmentalists have certainly not been consistently trium-
phant; environmental law is not an exact mirror of their heart-felt desires. Modern public and 
private law environmental doctrines contain reams of counterweights, balancings, and blunt-
ings of the environmentalists' protective principles and arguments. And "environmentalists," 
for that matter, are anything but a homogeneous monolith; they include a remarkable bi-
odiversity of individuals and groups. 
6. Like several other elements of this Essay, the example that follows is drawn in part 
from the Author's recently published casebook, ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 572-74, 674-
83 (1992) [hereinafter NLS) (addressing Department of Interior and Related Agencies Act, 
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(g), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989) (codified in scattered titles of 
u.S. C.». In compiling that book it appeared to us that the only way to make sense of the 
colossally complex morass that is modern environmental law was to study it as an activist-
driven creation, the result of an evolutionary process incorporating the new perspectives of 
environmental analysis into the entire legal system. Faced with the chronic hesitations of the 
HeinOnline -- 27 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 984 1993-1994
984 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:981 
tions Act for fiscal 1990,7 which subsequently appeared in several other 
annual funding bills, states that 
[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall be issued 
by any court of the United States with respect to any decision 
to prepare, advertise, offer, award, or operate ... timber sales in 
fiscal year 1990 from the thirteen national forests in Oregon 
and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in 
western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls. The 
provisions of section 705 of title 5, United States Code [author-
izing courts to stay agency actions], shall not apply to any chal-
lenge to such a timber sale: Provided, That the courts shall 
have authority to [issue permanent injunctions for timber sales 
found to be] arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law . . .. 8 
What is going on here? This appropriations rider is a legislative axe-
stroke from the pitched battles over the clear-cutting of the last remain-
ing stands of old-growth forests on the federal lands of the Pacific 
Northwest. 
On one side stand the advocates of a massive, final program of clear-
cutting-the timber industry and its close ally, the United States Forest 
official players in the law-making system, environmental law was built by attorneys and activ-
ists using every available nook and cranny of the existing legal process. 
This comprehensive, citizen-oriented legal process analysis of environmental law appears 
to have merit. A recent American Association of Law Schools workshop was launched in 
recognition of the pervasive legal process reach of the field, noting the extraordinary array of 
areas in the legal system in which environmental law has recently provided a cutting edge: 
administrative law, land use and natural resources, bankruptcy, criminal law, law and econom-
ics, insurance, local government, real property, torts, civil procedure, civil rights, corporations, 
constitutional law, ethics, jurisprudence, legal history, remedies, tax, international and com-
parative law, trusts, land finance, public utilities, poverty law, labor and occupational health, 
contracts, food and drug law, alternative dispute resolution processes, and more. These issues 
were discussed at the 1994 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting Mini Work-
shop, entitled Environmental Issues Across the Curriculum, in Orlando, Florida, on January 
6, 1994. 
7. Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter Appropriations Act]. Other provisions of this appropriations rider, no longer on 
the books, required the agencies to sell off increased annual quotas of timber, id. § 318(a)(I), 
103 Stat. at 745, restricted the cutting of certain ecologically significant old-growth forest 
stands except as necessary to meet the sales quota, id. § 318(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 746, directed the 
Forest Service to prepare a new spotted owl plan and have it in place by September 30, 1990, 
id. § 318(b)(6)(B), 103 Stat. at 747, insulated from judicial review Forest Service and Bureau of 
Land Management decisions shown to be based on outdated information, id. § 318(b)(6)(A), 
103 Stat. at 747, and made quasi-judicial findings to reverse two injunctions against timbercut-
ting, id. The latter were held valid in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1409 (1992). 
8. Apppropriations Act, § 318(g)(1), 103 Stat. at 749. 
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Service, the designated federal guardian of these public lands, backed by 
local congressional delegations. This side represents the center of grav-
ity, money, and power on this issue. 
On the other side stand "the environmentalists," a typical, motley 
collection of citizen volunteers: fishers, college students, aging hippies, 
retired foresters, ecologists, homemakers, bird watchers and other nature 
lovers, a few brave and foolhardy employees within the ranks of the in-
dustry and the Forest Service (including the remarkably courageous As-
sociation of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics 
(AFSEEE)), other public citizens, and several post-Rachel Carson non-
governmental organizations (NOOs) dedicated to environmental advo-
cacy and legal action.9 This side is largely comprised of volunteers and 
amateurs with severely limited resources and, at least until recently, little 
acknowledged legitimacy or hope of success. 
Looking at the results of federal timber policy over the years, the 
citizen environmentalists argued not only that the industry, having elimi-
nated most of the remaining virgin stands of Northwest forest in private 
hands, was on the verge of finishing off the precious last and most fragile 
of the public's old-growth forests, but also that in societal terms it made 
neither ecological nor economic sense to do so. 
Clear-cutting devastates forests, forever destroying the stable and 
rich biodiversity that they have developed over eons.1O It can have dev-
astating direct and indirect economic consequences as well. 
After a forested slope is clear-cut, the surface soils and lumbering 
detritus wash downgrade, where transient debris dams create flash-flood-
ing dangers, and sediments choke the streams. Clear-cut sedimentation 
9. Among the citizen organizations that mounted the old-growth ancient forests protec-
tion campaign were the national and local Audubon societies, Trout Unlimited, the Oregon 
Natural Resources Council, the University of Oregon Northwest Environmental Clinic, Lou 
Gold and the Siskiyou Regional Education Project, the Project Lighthawk Environmental 
Airforce, the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, the Headwa-
ters advocacy group, the Pacific Rivers Council, the Native Forests Council, the Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund, and the Earth Island Institute. 
10. I am assuming, not-so-arguendo, the basic sense of the environmentalists' arguments. 
Clear-cutting involves the elimination of virtually all trees and shrub vegetation in a forest, 
with piles of unwanted leftover "slash" burned off to prepare the way for a tree-farming, 
"even-age," single-species monoculture. The previous ecological eqUilibrium of the forest 
ends, with the variety of natural animal and plant species dropping from hundreds per acre to 
mere tens or less. The erosion, water temperature, and water budget consequences of the 
clear-cutting are felt far from the site. The regrown tree farms are less useful for public use, 
more susceptible to disease, and despite the public relations claims of the past 40 years, appar-
ently are insufficiently fertile to provide a sustainable timber resource. See 5 RICHARD RICE, 
THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y, NATIONAL FORESTS: POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, THE UN-
COUNTED COSTS OF LOGGING (1989). 
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and debris runoff has been a major cause of recent precipitous declines in 
the Pacific salmon fisheries by smothering or scouring fish-spawning 
habitat, and have reduced reservoir storage capacity and hydroelectric 
generation. These costs are hard to quantify, but are real nevertheless. II 
Job statistics provide a rough cross-industry comparison of relative im-
pacts: The stressed Pacific Northwest fisheries in 1991 still provided jobs 
for approximately 6000 fishers-drastically diminished from the years 
before extensive logging and dam building-half again as many as in the 
clear-cutting workforce in the same region at the same time. 12 
Then there is the economic fact that federal taxpayers massively 
subsidize this dysfunctional program. Federal taxpayers subsidize the 
timber industry in four major ways. The Forest Service (in ascending 
order) 
(1) sells timber from national forests below regular market 
price; 13 
11. E.g., Michael Stewartt, A Chain Saw Massacre in Our Forests, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 
1992, at C21. There is general agreement in the salmon industry that the drastic falI in the 
salmon catch in the Pacific Northwest-less than half of that caught just three years ago-has 
been caused by the combination of clear-cutting and continued burdens on migration routes by 
federal dams. The south fork of the Salmon River used to be the most important steel head and 
salmon stream in Idaho until it was wiped out by a U.S. Forest Service-sponsored clear-cut. 
The cash value of the timber was estimated at about $14 milIion; the state and federal govern-
ments subsequently estimated the value of the lost salmon ids in terms of economic return at 
$100 milIion. FLY ROD & REEL MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 19. 
12. CAROLYN ALKIRE, THE WILDERNESS SOC'y, WILD SALMON AS NATURAL CAPITAL: 
ACCOUNTING FOR SUSTAINABLE USE (1993) (citing W.A. WILCOX, NOTES ON THE FISHER-
IES OF THE PACIFIC COAST IN 1899 (1902»; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSI-
NESS PATTERNS tbl. I(B) (1993) (noting that 6136 total commercial fishers, hunters, and 
trappers in Oregon, Washington, and california, overwhelmingly comprised of fishers); H. 
MICHAEL ANDERSON & JEFFREY T. OLSON, FEDERAL FORESTS AND THE ECONOMIC BASE 
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1992); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 673; 1991 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. REP. OF THE U.S. 
FOREST SERVo Based on industry workforce reports, it has been calculated that selective log-
ging practices provide roughly twice as many jobs per forest acre than the more mechanized 
clear-cutting process. Telephone Interview with Tim Hermach, Executive Director, Native 
Forest Council (Feb. 28, 1994). 
Total steelhead, salmon, and char economic revenues in the Pacific Northwest, excluding 
Alaska, in the late 1980s totalIed approximately $1.25 bilIion annualIy. The industry as a 
whole supports 62,750 jobs. This fishery is currently about one-tenth its historic size. PACIFIC 
RIVERS COUNCIL, INC., RESEARCH REP. No. V, THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE OF PROTECT-
ING RIVERINE HABITAT IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 10 (1992). The total value of the com-
mercial salmonid harvest each year in the 1980s was approximately $233 million. Id. at 7. 
13. The Forest Service sets its auction base price with reference to the average potential 
buyer, rather than the normal appraisal standard-the price that would be paid by a willing 
buyer to a wilIing private market seller. See Robert E. Wolf, National Forest Timber Sales alld 
the Legacy a/Gifford Pinchot: Managing a Forest and Makillg It Pay, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1037, 1065 n.157 (1989). 
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(2) spends several hundred million dollars per year building 
and maintaining logging roads in rugged terrain-to date the 
Forest Service has built seven times more road mileage than the 
entire interstate highway system-and providing other free 
services to the industry. In many cases the timber itself is sold 
below the government's own out-of-pocket cash-flow costs. 
From 1979 to 1991 the Forest Service sold 124 billion board 
feet at a loss of $3.5 billion; 14 
(3) pays twenty-five percent of gross timber receipts as grants 
to local communities in lieu of property taxes; 15 and 
(4) as noted above, fails to account for the largest subsidy of 
all: ecological costs, including the loss of salmon runs, the per-
manent sacrifice of thousands of acres of diverse natural forests, 
often on fragile, high-elevation, steep slopes that otherwise 
would be available for multiple, nonlogging public uses, as well 
as ethical and aesthetic concems. 16 
987 
In other words the environmental position in the old-growth clear-
cutting controversy, as in so many environmental battles, is that if you 
do a rational overall economic and ecological analysis weighing the pro-
gram's real benefits17 against all the real costs, in light of available alter-
natives,18 the net rational decision for society is to do it differently: End 
the subsidized old-growth clear-cutting. This is a conclusion supported 
by hardheaded economists outside the industry and the Forest Service, as 
14. If interest is figured in, this is a net loss of $6.3 billion. In addition to providing log-
ging roads, the Forest Service also' surveys and inventories timberlands, provides fire protec-
tion, staff personnel and structures, creates maps, and controls disease. Under cost-accounting 
analysis most of the 122 national forests have never earned a penny on timber, and in 1990 
only 15 showed a cash-flow profit. Wolf, supra note 13, at 1074-75; Perri Knize, The Misman-
agement 0/ the National Forests, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1991, at 98, 101, 103; BELOW-
COST TIMBER SALES TASK FORCE, SOCIETY OF AM. FORESTERS, A QUESTION OF VALUES: 
BELOW-CoST TIMBER SALES ON THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1988) (arguing that recreational 
benefits of logging roads and similar positive effects justify below-cost timber sales). 
15. In 1990 this amounted to $327 million. The theory of these payments is that the fed-
eral government ought to contribute because it is exempt from state and local property taxa-
tion. The Forest Service does not reckon these and many other public costs against revenues in 
figuring net revenues. Knize, supra note 14, at 103. 
16. See Tom Barlow, Evolution o/the National Forest Management Act 0/1976,8 ENVTL. 
L. 539, 543-44 (1978); Steve Young, Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work, WASH. POST, Aug. 
13, 1989, at B3. 
17. Examples of such alternatives include logging profits, continuation of some logging 
jobs, and local logging settlements' way of life at least over the short term. 
18. These include elimination of subsidies, disincentives against exports of unprocessed 
logs, selective cutting, long-term sustainable management, and retraining for loggers. 
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well as authoritative international resource analysts,19 and would seem at 
least to have deserved some serious consideration in the public forum. 
Without environmental litigation, however, there would have been 
virtually no effective public debate. The official players in the timber 
arena, both governmental and corporate, had no interest in acknowledg-
ing the clear-cutting program's negative consequences or making a realis-
tic overall economic, much less ecological, assessment of the program.20 
The "Iron Triangle" formed by the regulated industry, its regulators in 
the bureaucracy, and the local congressional delegation,21 had been 
molded into a powerful onrolling status quo, each enjoying its own intri-
cate system of rewards that flowed from maintaining clear-cutting poli-
cies without acknowledging costs to the public and the national legacy. 
The industry gets its free roads and below-cost public timber. The Forest 
Service gets its "stumpage" measure of production to show performance 
of its politically perceived mission and the political cachet that goes with 
it, and some federal officials will eventually take the revolving door into a 
second career in the timber industry. The industry's congressional 
spokespersons get the strategic rewards of satisfying large local economic 
interests and campaign contributors. In the economic terms of rational 
individual maximization of self-interest, each found it advantageous to 
ignore the diffuse social costs of the clear-cutting regime. Because public 
forests cost nothing to create-and ecosystem damages are hard to ac-
count for because they are extremely diffuse, partly aesthetic, and gener-
19. WORLD FORESTS FOR THE FUTURE: THEIR USE AND CONSERVATION (Kilaparli 
Ramakrishna & George Woodwell eds., 1993); WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR 
COMMON FUTURE 136-37 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. At the Rio Summit 
world leaders signed the Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus of the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests. The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 882 (1992). 
20. Why did environmental regulatory agencies like the state and federal fish and wildlife 
services fail to intervene to force consideration of the destructive effects of clear-cutting? To 
observers of environmental politics, that is a naive question because protective agencies have so 
long been politically outgunned, suborned, repressed, or co-opted by the resource-exploitation 
establishment, which includes rival sister agencies as well as industry and its legislative allies. 
See, e.g., NLS, supra note 6, at 608 (noting that state and federal conservation agencies are 
willing but unable to protect watersheds being channelized by United States Soil Conservation 
Service). 
21. The term "Iron Triangle" appears to have been used originally by Professor Bruce 
Hannon at the University of Illinois and the Coalition for American Rivers in the late 1960s in 
efforts to resist the water resources pork barrel. The term has useful descriptive application in 
a wide variety of agency-industry settings. The blocs depicted in the old-growth clear-cutting 
controversy are replicated in the grazing, mining, and agricultural subsidy arenas and roughly 
paralleled in the pollution control wars. 
Somewhat confusingly, of course, under the rubric being used here, the bipolar paradigm 
often leads to Iron Triangles. Go figure. 
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ally difficult to quantify22-the official players could safely externalize 
these costs while internalizing their own slices of the economic and polit-
ical profits. In our present system no official entity has the fail-safe oper-
ational task of making sure that agencies comply with laws and that 
governmental programs make overall sense. 
The citizens who spoke for the trees, the ecosystem, and the overall 
social-cost accounting initially could find no place in the public policy 
forum. Citizen environmentalists had no expertise, it was argued; this 
was a field for professionals. If they did find professionals willing to 
speak for the overview, these voices would be dismissed as disgruntled 
mavericks. In other cases the environmentalists have been straightfor-
wardly excluded as gratuitous self-appointed interlopers, with no official 
stake in the matter. In the press as well as the corridors of power, envi-
ronmentalists are often treated as marginal gadflies, at least until they get 
an injunction. 
Since a straightforward public debate on federal clear-cutting pro-
grams was not possible, the public-interest citizens could either go home 
or go to court. As in so many other tough issues, they chose the latter 
with all its burdens. 
In a lineup oflegal claims that reflects the heritage and battle plan of 
a typical environmental law campaign,23 the citizens filed lawsuits 
against the clear-cutting program alleging violations of a variety of stat-
utes that consciously or unwittingly incorporated Carson-style account-
ings: Forest Service timber sales were alleged to be in violation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),24 which requires 
federal agencies to do some comprehensive looking before leaping; the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976,25 which is supposed to require 
22. A fundamental problem in many environmental cases is that there is no ready market 
in the legacy value of resources or quality of life. Environmental law is again pioneering inno-
vative methods of resource accounting to cure this deficit. See NLS, supra note 6, at 56-57, 
166-68. But even where cash dollar values are available to demonstrate the overall economic 
preferability of the environmental position, official decision makers, who after all live in their 
own internalized benefit-cost contexts, still regularly go against optimal social choices. See 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and 
Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 814-18 (1986) (noting that pork-barrel regu-
lars overrode unanimous cabinet-level economic verdict that contended project was worth far 
less than river valley and ecosystem it would destroy). 
23. Unlike many major environmental law cases, however, the old-growth forest cases do 
not appear to have included nonstatutory causes of action. In many other cases, like the Ex-
xon Valdez oil spill, the common law has continued to provide a sophisticated, flexible, practi-
cal environmental litigation platform. 
24. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993). 
25. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C.). 
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effective overall official planning, taking account of a broad swath of pub-
lic concerns in the public forests; the Federal Oregon and California 
Railroad Land Grant Act;26 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act;27 the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA);28 the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 (ESA);29 and others.30 None of these legal 
vehicles required an overall rational public cost-benefit analysis of the 
clear-cutting program.3! To varying degrees, however, each offered some 
purchase on the problem, especially after the not-coincidental discovery 
that the ecological qualities of the last old-growth forests were intimately 
linked to the fate of the endangered Northern spotted owl, Strix DC-
cidentalis caurina.32 
Most of these statutes incorporated some elements of the Carson 
Paradigm's expanded accounting perspective. They also owed their 
existence to the pluralism of outsider citizens. Some had key provisions 
drafted by citizens.33 All had been made into effective law, not by official 
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1181g (1988). 
27. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988). 
28. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). 
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act, in effect, casts endangered 
species in the role of sensitive backup triggers for mandatory substantive official response in 
situations where other planning and protective systems have failed. 
30. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668ee (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992), although not the basis of litigation, was useful in requiring interagency survey-
ing of consequential effects upon fish and wildlife. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), was utilized to probe administrative processes and the plaintiffs 
even considered filing civil RICO suits against the federal officials whose obstruction of statu-
tory compliance is evidenced in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089-91 
(W.O. Wash. 1991). See NLS, supra note 6, at 674-84. 
Different statutes aim at different stages of the administrative process. The Endangered 
Species Act, for instance, too often comes inefficiently late in the game, at the end of project 
planning. Secretary Bruce Babbitt has emphasized that the better long-term strategy is fore-
sight planning to avoid endangerment in the first place. Habitat loss is a primary cause of 
endangerment, so land-based economic controversies will predictably continue. 
31. There is not, and probably never will be, a Federal Prevention of Destructive Subsi-
dized Giveaways Act. 
32. It is not coincidental that many endangered species exist as vivid ecological indica-
tors-canaries in the coal mines-of places and resources that are endangered and valuable to 
humans as well. The leading cause of endangerment is habitat destruction, and when a highly 
specialized species no longer has sufficient places to live and breed, that means such places are 
being lost to humans as well. The important timber cases are chronicled in Victor M. Sher, 
Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. 
REV. 41 (1993). 
33. The only teeth in NEPA, the environmental impact statement requirements, derived 
from Professor Lynton Caldwell's draft language; § 7 of the Endangered Species Act appar-
ently was drafted by Tom Garrett, then at Friends of the Earth, and Frank Potter. The 
FLPMA was forged from extensive public participation in the Public Lands Review Commis-
sion hearings. 
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governmental implementation but rather by relentless and sophisticated 
citizen litigation in courts and agency proceedings.34 
It was not until the citizens had won preliminary injunctions in sev-
eral of these cases that the official players and the press began to take 
them seriously as participants in the public policy debate. For the press, 
our governing information system,35 injunctions were news that legiti-
mized coverage of the environmentalist combatants' side of the story. As 
for the official players, they were stung-not into compliance but into 
extensive counterattacks. The citizens who were proving that federal 
conservation statutes were being violated were branded as dangerous 
radicals, attacking the American system. The defendants attempted to 
get the environmentalists' attorneys disbarred, to have the environmental 
law clinic that had brought several cases disbanded, and to have the law 
professors supervising student efforts censured by their university. Em-
ployees within the Forest Service and the industry were fired, demoted, 
transferred, or suffered similar reprisals for failing to tailor data to fit 
official needs, and internal sources of leaked information were energeti-
cally pursued.36 The so-called Wise Use movement, another in a series of 
industry-spawned "public interest" organizations,37 produced vitupera-
tive media attacks on the owl and old-growth forest advocates.38 Each 
34. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text. 
35. Day in and day out it seems to many participants in national policy debates that it is 
not what government actually knows, but what the press perceives and transmits to the public 
that shapes government policy. In the snail darter-Tellico dam battle, the Secretary of Interior 
himself conveyed the God Committee's unanimous economic findings against the dam to every 
member of Congress. See Plater, supra note 22, at 813-14. Because the press frustratingly 
failed to carry that part of the story, Congress ultimately felt free to ignore the merits and roll 
the pork barrel, and Jimmy Carter, piteously apologizing, decided he could not counter the 
ridicule attached to the press's version of the fish story. Id. at S14 & n.33. 
36. AFSEEE has noted numerous examples of Forest Service employees, particularly bi-
ologists, who got in trouble trying to do their jobs accurately while resisting the timber-ori-
ented pressures within the agency hierarchy. Telephone Interview with Jeff DeBonis, 
Founder, AFSEEE (Feb. 24, 1994) [hereinafter DeBonis Interview]. Internal agency reports 
that demonstrated the validity of the citizen enforcers' complaints were lost in the bureaucracy 
and only mysteriously made available to the citizens. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Ev-
ans, 771 F. Supp. lOS1 (W.O. Wash. 1991). 
37. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity/or All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984). 
3S. The Wise Users argue that the citizens in the forest controversy are "out in left field[,] 
... the biggest hYpocrites in the world ... , making us a nation of naysayers." Julie Bailey, 
Logger: Regain Control of Resources, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Oct. 25, 1991, at AI. The 
Wise Use movement, cribbing its conservation label from Gifford Pinchot, who would not 
appreciate the appropriation, represents the positions of subsidized industries and other inter-
ests chafing under changing public consciousness of resource issues. Its well-financed cam-
paigns have attracted much ink, even though its message is self-serving and eschews analysis 
on the merits, preferring to characterize environmentalists as analogs to Nazis and the like. 
See, e.g., Charles P. Alexander, Gunning/or the Greens, TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 50. 
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citizen lawsuit was carried into continuing cycles of judicial appeals and 
remands. These were not unusual reactions. The only classic an-
tienvironmental tactic missing from the old-growth story was a defensive 
SLAPP suit-a "strategic lawsuit against public participation" counter-
suit seeking defamation damages and enjoining environmental 
enforcement. 39 
And the timber industry's congressional representatives added sec-
tion 318(g) to the 1989 appropriations bill. 
Now let's consider section 318(g) on its terms. Leaving aside the 
question of the appropriations bill vehicle,4O as a matter of its legal func-
tion, section 318(g) is designed to prevent federal courts from granting 
preliminary equitable relief in challenges against the most contested tim-
ber sales, which happen to involve the spotted owl. By the time a court is 
able to hold a permanent injunction hearing, it appears, the issue would 
be moot.41 
But what is the provision's unspoken premise? Clearly its sponsors 
wanted clear-cutting of public old-growth forests to continue unques-
tioned and unabated. Clearly they would have liked to override the con-
servation statutes that provide the forest advocates' legal ammunition, 
but did not have the votes to do so. 
The timber lobbyists and their congressional spokespersons realized, 
however, that they did not have to repeal the statutes in order to nullify 
the existing protective laws. All they had to do was block citizen en-
forcement actions.42 
Note the implicit premise, undoubtedly understood by all who 
worked on the bill: Why would the timber lobbyists gain their objective 
39. See NLS, supra note 6, at 121. Several SLAPP-like lawsuits were, however, filed for 
interference with business profits owing to citizen demonstrations at clear-cutting sites. 
DeBonis Interview, supra note 36. 
40. Appropriations bills are theoretically prohibited from overriding substantive law, see 
H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 608-627 (1987); S. Doc. No.1, looth Cong., 1st 
Sess. §§ 14-16 (1988), because of fears that bills in the appropriations process, the home of the 
pork barrel, can circumvent substantive legislative committees and substantive criticism. 
Courts typically construe appropriations riders narrowly. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of 
Government Agencies through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456. But if Congress vio-
lates its own rules by expressly passing a substantive rider on an appropriations bill, it will be 
given effect. See Plater, supra note 22, at 843-44. 
41. At the very least, litigating under shadow of the axe while timber program operations 
continue is a shaky process. 
42. Citizen plaintiffs are virtually the only people who use the courts to enforce federal 
forest laws. This is taken for granted, but is interesting on its own terms. Decisions reporting 
agency judicial enforcement actions are hard to find, which indicates either that the industry 
feels it lacks the ability to object successfully against administrative enforcement or, more 
likely, that it rarely has reason to object to administrative enforcement. 
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if citizen suits were stymied? Because once citizen enforcement was re-
moved, the industry and the Forest Service would be free to violate the 
laws passed to regulate them, and would matter-of-factly continue doing 
so. The purpose of section 318(g) was to allow both the industry and its 
federal regulators to ignore the conservation laws.43 The modern admin-
istrative state's only credible mechanism for seeing that these federal stat-
utes were obeyed was public-interest litigation brought by citizen 
volunteers.44 
Ultimately, the barrage of environmental lawsuits against clear-cut-
ting old-growth forests, although not stopping the clear-cutting, has 
slowed it, and has brought the timber issue to the level of open national 
policy debate. There has been extensive coverage from the national me-
dia, growing public awareness of some of the subtleties of the issue, 
pointed congressional debates questioning the rationality of the subsidy 
program, and a freshman President dragooned to the Pacific Northwest 
to attempt a Timber Summit resolution of the matter.45 The statutory 
exemption carried by section 318 has been removed from the books, in 
part due to a petition to Congress signed by 458 law school deans and 
faculty members protesting the provision.46 New forest resource legisla-
tion is likely to follow up on the lessons of the spotted ow1.47 Jack Ward 
43. This is not the only example of an appropriations provision designed to advance a 
special interest through encouragement oflawbreaking. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 105 (7th ed. 1979) (noting Border Patrol budget cuts to encourage illegal 
immigrant labor for Southwestern agriculture and cuts in labor inspector funding to weaken 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1993». 
44. That the rationale was not the avoidance of meritless litigation is indicated by the fact 
that even in a field so subject to judicial deference to agency authority, there have been sub-
stantial numbers of injunctions issued in these citizen actions. 
45. The Timber Summit, or Forest Conference as it was renamed, took place in Portland, 
Oregon, on April 2, 1993. See Sher, supra note 32; Victor M. Sher, Key Resultsfrom Forest 
Conference, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 16, 1993, at 18; see also u.S. FOREST SERVo & 
BUREAU OF LIVESTOCK AND MINING, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT ON HABITAT FOR LATE SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD GROWTH FOREST RELATED 
SPECIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1993) (providing historical 
narrative of clear-cutting progam and spotted owl). 
The recently announced Clinton Administration compromise restricting old-growth log-
ging to 693,000 acres of the total remaining 4.8 million unprotected acres offederal old-growth 
forest does not please environmentalists, who had called for a complete cessation of the pro-
gram. It does, however, accept their fundamental premise that the program is destructive and 
requires curtailment. See Timothy Egan, Tight Logging Limit Set in Northwest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 1994, at AlO. 
46. Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape. Eroding the Laws: Con-
gressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 435, 488-89 & n.270 (1991). 
47. Congress has already overturned some old timber shibboleths, including the sweet-
heart long-term slash-and-burn timper contracts of the Tongass National Forest. Tongass 
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Thomas, the new head of the Forest Service, has issued a reformist 
message to his staff in the field and in Washington that begins, "We will: 
(1) Obey the law ... [and] (2) [t]ell the truth.,,48 Whatever comes of it 
all, can anyone seriously believe that this important national public pol-
icy debate would ever have happened without citizen environmental 
litigation? 
And the history of the old-growth clear-cutting battles illustrates 
how environmental law has become a metaphor for fundamental changes 
in the way American society makes its decisions. 
III. AMERICA BEFORE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
It is not that there was no environmental law for the first 175 years 
of the Republic, but rather that it was quite marginal, and citizens played 
little organized part in its formation. What we now would identify as 
environmental law lay in the interstices of the common law, principally 
in the law of neighbors, in occasional regulatory provisions of local 
health codes, or in statutes of the polite conservation variety. And it did 
not yet have a name. 
Under common law some cases that now would be called environ-
mental were brought to court and successfully achieved remedies for pol-
lution harms.49 Common law, however, created no consistent body of 
case law recognizing the broad legitimacy of environmental protection, 
and it often bowed matter-of-factly to the national mission of 
industrialization. so 
Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, §§ 101-103, 105(b), 104 Stat. 4426, 4426, 4427 
(1990) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 539d (Supp. IV 1992». 
48. Memorandum from Jack Ward Thomas, Chief, U.S. Forest Service, to Deputy Chiefs, 
National Foresters, Station Directors, Area Director, and TITF Director (Dec. 9, 1993) (on 
file with author). He stated, "We will: 
Obey the law. 
Tell the truth. 
Implement ecosystem management. 
Develop new knowledge, synthesize research and apply it to management of natural 
resources. 
Build a Forest Service organization for the 21st century. 
Trust and make full use of our hard-working, expert workforce." 
49. See Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913) (holding pollution 
of stream justified shutting down paper factory to protect farmer's water supply); Wilcox v. 
Henry, 77 P. 1055 (Wash. 1904) (granting public nuisance injunction against rendering plant 
smells). 
50. See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1932) (hold-
ing no remedy for air pollution degradation of plaintiff's residence); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (pa. 1886) (holding riparians' common-law rights to unpolluted 
water "must yield to the necessities of a great public industry"), overruled by Commonwealth 
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974). Indeed, the fear of hindering economic 
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In the years before the 1960s, the dominant players in American 
governance were the marketplace and the government agencies that had 
been delegated the function of market oversight. The economic market-
place has arguably always been the most powerful "government" of 
American life, the true driving force of the Revolution that cut us off 
from colonial rule and set us on our manifest destiny march of conquest 
across the continent. Government did not -readily leap to assume the role 
of vigilant counterweight to the excesses of the marketplace. 
In public law, with minor exceptions,51 early enactments in the nat-
ural resources field typically reflected the economic manifest destiny 
principle. State and federal homestead, mining, and other resource ex-
ploitation acts focused on getting the resource base into the economy, 
with virtually no conservation standards. 52 Even after the geographical 
frontier was no more, the frontier ethic of enterprise and exploitation, 
ignoring the consequences or moving on-a systemic externalization of 
costs-continued to be reflected in positive law. 
The "unipolar" power structure,53 and the extreme laissez-faire par-
adigm of public government that served it, however, shifted in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a more actively "bipolar" 
model. Faced with trusts and corporations unknown to the Framers, 
government agencies were occasionally given limited mandates to control 
some of the most obvious excesses of unrestrained market power. 54 
In the environmental field the Forest Service, which was launched at 
the turn of the century,55 was one of very few public regulatory agencies 
designed to be an active protector of the nation's natural heritage. Even 
in the New Deal's proliferation of agencies, in which the regulators in the 
bipolar paradigm for a time actually took on very active planning and 
development seems to have led many courts to adopt a general balance-of-utility defense so 
that polluting defendants were virtually immune from tort prosecution. See NLS, supra note 
6, at 114-15, 134-36. 
51. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,93-94 (1821) (holding right of public to fish in 
stream notwithstanding objection by riparian owner). 
52. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1988); see a/so, e.g., Grand Canyon National Park Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 224 (1988) (protecting homestead rights including mineral rights in creation of na-
tional park). 
53. I think this concept derives from Richard B. Stewart's analysis in The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
54. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was the first major federal regulatory 
agency launched in 1897 by popUlist fervors but with powers that soon were co-opted by the 
industry it regulated. See NLS, supra note 6, at 537-38. 
55. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911) (upholding Secretary of Agri-
culture's authority to restrict grazing on national forest lands). 
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managerial roles, very few conservation regulations were passed. 56 The 
most successful area of environmental initiatives before the mid-twenti-
eth century was undoubtedly the preservationist-conservationist ethic of 
Teddy Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and other silk-stocking mavericks. 
Their movement, however, did not define or address environmental 
threats broadly. National parks legislation, grand though it was, focused 
on isolated niches of the American landscape, not on regulatory 
objectives. S7 
Legislating public interest counterweights to marketplace power and 
actually accomplishing a functioning balance between private and public 
policy, moreover, turned out to be two very different propositions. 
Although several regulation-oriented statutes were passed, they generally 
amounted to very little in either the natural resource or pollution control 
areas. Agencies like the Forest Service and the Grazing Service58 quickly 
fell prey to the classic double-pronged counterattacking tactics of the 
marketplace-strident resistance and seduction. 59 Soon the powers and 
perspectives of the industry they regulated effectively captured them.60 
In the fields of air and water pollution control, a variety of statutory 
systems appeared at both the federal and state level, but the same market 
56. For example, the Soil Conservation Service that tamed the Dust Bowl did so primarily 
through education and grants rather than regulation. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 590a to 590q-3 (1988). 
57. The national park system, clearly a pioneering concept in resource protection, was 
proprietary rather than regulatory and generally avoided treading too directly on market inter-
ests. Roosevelt and Pinchot epitomized the noblesse oblige Brahmin class and were far from 
pluralist democratic antiestablishmentarians. William O. Douglas, on the other hand, who 
stood within the current of the conservation movement, targeted his interests and systemic 
criticisms more broadly, including issues of pollution and urban quality of life. 
58. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 was another early attempt to restrict resource deroga-
tion, designed to address the obvious destructive consequences of overgrazing on public lands. 
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-3160 (1988). 
59. In 1892 the Attorney General under President Cleveland wrote to the president of a 
railroad in response to the latter's plea for abolition of the ICC: .. 'The part of wisdom is not 
to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.''' Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the 
Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.7 (1954) (quoting 
Richard Olney). 
60. See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management IL' The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1982). 
The U.S. Grazing Service along with the General Land Office became the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) in 1946, but the capture phenomenon continued, as shown by the BLM's 
chronic jest name, Bureau of Livestock and Mining. 
"We don't want to be a regulatory agency. We want to be a development agency on our 
national lands," said former Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan in a speech to coal industry 
executives and a press conference thereafter, explaining why his department would continue to 
refrain from strict enforcement of strip-mining regulations. Keith Schneider, u.s. Mille 111-
spectors Charge Interference by Agency Director, N.Y. TIMES, Nov: 22, 1992, at AI. 
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pressures sharply restricted the potential and practicability of their regu-
latory stringency. 61 
The putative bipolar structure of societal governance, with official 
governmental watchdogs guarding against market excesses, in practice 
often evolved into a unipolar, laissez-faire love-nest, as the marketplace 
co-opted the guardians. The legal profession did its part, developing an 
expansive body of administrative law on behalf of industry, designed to 
constrain and cut back the generally highhanded and much-resented po-
tency of New Deal agencies. In 1946 the Administrative Procedures Act 
(AP A)62 was pushed through Congress, saddling agencies with required 
minimum standards of process to be given to regulated parties and pro-
viding for generous judicial review. 
By 1955 the erstwhile opposing counterweights of the marketplace 
and government had moved sufficiently close together that Henry Fairlie 
could realistically dub them "the Establishment,"63 a sociopolitical 
mechanism run by the official players, private and public, with no room 
in the system for citizens. 
In the environmental area the premise of private enterprise, gener-
ally seconded by the governmental regulators, was that maximizing di-
rect economic net benefits to business was an unambiguous societal good, 
with only the most egregious negative consequences and by-products de-
serving official attention as exceptions to the general rule. Environmen-
tal quality as well as other social costs were presumptive sacrificial trade-
offs. Needless to say, citizens were not welcomed as active players in the 
environmental policy arena. The ongoing social balance was negotiated 
within the two official blocs, government and industry. Concerns about 
61. See NLS, supra note 6, at 722, 764-66, 827-28. 
62. Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1988)). Today, reflecting the contemporary reality of the regulator-regu-
lated industry alliance, Justice Rehnquist has been able to read APA history upside down as 
setting maximum procedural requirements when citizens attempt to win improved procedures 
in court. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that APA established maximum procedural requirements 
Congress was willing to have courts impose on federal agencies in rule-making proceedings, 
not just minimum procedures as previously thought). 
63. Henry Fairlie may have borrowed the term from a predecessor, but it was he who 
popularized it. See Henry Fairlie: Tribute to the Late Journalist, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 26, 
1990, at 6 (citing Henry Fairlie, THE SPECTATOR, (London, Sept. 23, 1955)). The phrase took 
on some connotations of stridency in the post-1960s but clearly has useful denotative power. 
Iron Triangles, I suppose, are more specific descriptive subsets of the Establishment. 
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the natural environment were better left to the professional managers in 
the field, corporate and governmental-even AIdo Leopold thought SO.64 
IV. THE REVOLUTION OF THE 19605 
Well, actually, in retrospect the 1960s did not totally end the pat-
terns of the past and usher in the Age of Aquarius. The 1960s did, how-
ever, bring several remarkable and fundamental changes in theories of 
social governance that have ultimately been reflected in the legal system, 
most notably in environmental law. 
In effect Rachel Carson spread a broad intellectual catch-basket be-
neath the Coasian welfare economists' universe of benefit-maximizing 
individual actors, so as to collect and take overall account of their jet-
tisoned "externalized" social costs, even if they are indirect and 
unmarketized.6s 
Economics literature and Ronald Coase's 1960 article have clarified 
some important elements of human behavior generally, including the na-
ture of humans in economic enterprises and in government agencies.66 
The fundamental perception was that all individual decision makers will 
attempt to maximize the amount of benefits they can internalize to them-
selves, by externalizing the maximum related and consequential costs 
onto others who will not be able to hold them accountable. Optimisti-
cally, like many economists, Coase thought that externalities could be 
marketized and privately ordered, so that the marketplace would never-
theless achieve overall optimal choices without requiring the artifices of 
governmental contro1.67 His description of the problem, however, has 
been more useful than his optimistic solution. Private profit-seeking 
64. Although Leopold's A Sand County Almanac was a lyric scientific expansion of John 
Muir's early twentieth-century natural ethics, Leopold was very much a professional resource 
manager, generally aiming his writings at his colleagues rather than the public at large. 
65. There is no such word as "unmarketized," but it is a useful term for denoting conse-
quences that do not traditionally or conveniently have a monetary or political market value, 
but which nevertheless have societal importance. 
66. See Coase, supra note 1, at 3-5, 42-44. The human-nature calculus described by econ-
omists for individuals in the marketplace also describes the individual calculus of agency deci-
sion makers: A public official deciding whether to dream up a massive public works project to 
dam a river, drain a wetland, or build a hundred miles of lumber roads into wilderness does 
not have to pay for the resources. They are already owned by government or can be paid for 
with taxpayer dollars, which likewise are effectively free to the Iron Triangle. Losses of natu-
ral values are traditionally costless. Agencies feel internal benefits in terms of power-political 
heft and ability to spend budgets-and their institutional momentum. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 
747, 754-55 (1982). 
67. This requires heroic assumptions about measurability of consequences, as well as per-
fect information, no transaction costs, and no disparate access to markets or disparate re-
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mechanisms are so powerful, the receiving commons so diffuse and hard 
to monitor, and the brokerage system required to trade in social costs so 
difficult to conceive, that the old bipolar players have been largely able to 
continue their business as usual. Social costs continue to be generated 
and accumulate in clouds of vastly troublesome externalizations. Private 
corporate decision makers and public agency officials still often operate 
as if in an insulated sphere, ignoring the detritus and accumulated inter-
acting consequences of their actions. 
Rachel Carson showed that predictable systemic pr~blems follow 
when official players make decisions in traditional terms, looking with a 
narrowed field of vision at short-term benefits and one-shot technological 
horizons. You got bugs? Go spray a pesticide. Zap. Now you've got 
what you wanted. Dead bugs. The end. 
Carson taught that this is not all that happens. There is no such 
thing as a simple, one-shot technology; everything has continuing long-
term consequences. Pesticides do not just kill target bugs, they kill many 
of their ecological neighbors as well, eliminating the rich, stable equilib-
rium that had naturally evolved to give the land its fertility in the first 
place.68 Pesticides do not just disappear after they have killed the target 
bugs. They linger on and on, blowing in the wind, leaching into ground-
water, moving up through ecological food chains. The lessons Carson 
drew from DDT pesticides, moreover, readily applied themselves to 
many other settings as well-not only to other kinds of pollution, but 
also to resource management issues like timber and grazing, to highway 
and transportation planning, pharmaceuticals and health technology, 
and by extension to many other areas of national policy.69 Although 
humans may not take account of the true social and ecological costs of 
their actions, nature keeps a comprehensive tab, and real consequences 
follow.70 
sources. See Coase, supra note I, at 15-16; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental 
Law: A Normative Critique o/Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992). 
68. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 54-57, 61. It is remarkable in retrospect how books 
written by three women at virtually the same historical moment so powerfully reshaped so 
much of modem American society's view of life: RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); 
JANE JACOB, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); and BETTY 
FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). 
69. Without casting the proposition so universally as to be meaningless, the crux of Car-
son's logical reminder of the need to account comprehensively for consequences direct and 
indirect, positive and negative, obviously holds logical significance for current debates about 
industrial policy, immigration, welfare, and indeed virtually all human decision making. 
70. When there is uncertainty about the scale of consequences, ecology also teaches the 
precautionary principle-that we should disrupt as little as possible the long-evolved diversity 
and eqUilibrium we inherited. 
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Rachel Carson's paradigm also changed the scope and hierarchy of 
the perceptual landscape we apply to human actions. King Canute 
notwithstanding, Western societies have traditionally tended to view 
human actors as the central players in the life of the planet, with nature 
as a subservient and pliant backdrop.71 Carson showed through the eco-
logical realm that the backdrop to human activity may be far larger in 
scale and importance than the humans pirouetting in the foreground. 
Nature has developed a richly diverse and interacting natural equilib-
rium, communities of communities spread around the planet providing 
services previously unrecognized, fulfilling important productive func-
tions previously taken for granted, capable of causing broadly destructive 
systemic consequences when they are jostled out of balance.72 
From this perspective an important utilitarian precautionary princi-
ple asserted itself: Unless you are pretty sure that the background foun-
dational equilibria will not be disrupted, or that the negative 
consequences will be foreseeable, minor, and mitigatable, you had better 
be sure that what you propose to do is worth the potential costs; it is 
safer not to risk casually the escalating domino consequences that may 
follow. 73 In this regard Carson showed that moving from a human-cen-
tered, master-of-nature perspective to the holistic, human-species-as-con-
stituent-part-of-nature view is not just an ethical idea, it is fundamentally 
practical and utilitarian as well. 
Silent Spring, an essentially scientific disquisition, found a remarka-
bly broad, energetic, and engaged public audience. In the 1960s citizens 
had suddenly begun to discover themselves, thanks to the civil rights 
71. See NLS, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
72. A homely example is Carson's discussion of the crucial role of diverse soil bacteria and 
earthworms in creating and maintaining soil fertility. Once the soil is poisoned by pesticides 
over vast areas, exterminating or drastically reducing these ecological chains, humans must try 
to replicate the natural pest-control and nutrient-investment cycles. To do this artificially, it 
turns out, is expensive and not very successful. See CARSON, supra note I, at 55-56, 107-08, 
253-55. 
Another vivid extension of Carson's bacteria and earthworm analysis is the human urge 
to dam flowing water. The Aswan Dam and others like it are huge, dramatic edifices ulti-
mately dwarfed by their prosaic natural consequences: little snail-borne schistosomes killing 
and maiming tens of thousands of valley residents; little grains of sediment, deposited by the 
trillions, clogging reservoirs and blocking turbines, causing the washing away of thousands of 
acres of downstream valley lands and coastline, and cutting off nutrient flows to maritime 
fishing industries; and so on. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multi-Lateral Lending Banks. Environ-
mental Diseconomies. and the International Lending Process: The Example of Third World 
Dams, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169 (1989). 
73. The precautionary principle has lately achieved international recognition. emerging as 
a major international policy norm. See The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
princ. IS, U.N. Doc. AlConf.151/5 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (advocating alterna-
tives to chemical control of insects). 
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movement, Vietnam, Ralph Nader's consumerism, and the media.74 By 
the end of the 1960s, environmental consciousness had percolated suffi-
ciently as a popular phenomenon and it flooded into the national political 
process, not as a typical American single-issue reform movement but as a 
new way of reacting to a wide array of issues.75 Environmental problems 
were broadly energizing.76 They turned out not only to be in everyone's 
backyard, but also were perceptibly linked to ever-broader levels of envi-
ronmental issues, with analogs to a wide array of other social problem 
areas as well. The citizens grabbed Silent Spring and ran with it. Some 
ran to the newspapers, some to communes, some to legislatures. 
But the center of momentum for the first wave of environmental law 
clearly went to the courts, using preexisting common and statutory law. 
In lawsuits filed by environmentally conscious citizens, private nuisance 
actions became more common in the pollution. setting; the public nui-
sance action grew beyond its traditional settings; the public trust doctrine 
was rediscovered and applied to complex resource controversies; and at-
tempts were made to retarget statutes like the 1899 Rivers and Harbors 
Act.77 Even when these early citizen activists chose to try legislative ac-
74. The debt to the civil rights movement, Vietnam, and Ralph Nader is undeniable. 
These pioneered the pluralism of people power, citizen-policy analysis, and public interest 
shadow government, and showed how to open the newsroom and courthouse doors. I would 
argue that environmental law has achieved a different level of complexity and power, however, 
because unlike these predecessor initiatives it is not focused on an issue, but rather on the 
much-broader terrain of the Rachel Carson Paradigm's analytical construct. 
Why did these phenomena happen in the 1960s? Perhaps because of prosperity, educa-
tion, a mid-century sense of a need for overall assessment of where we were going, and, of 
course, because the media had given Americans such vivid new perspectives of themselves as a 
continental village. 
75. Even Richard Nixon was impressed enough with the political appeal of environmental-
ism that he tentatively proposed a Clean Air Act amendment setting a moratorium deadline on 
the production of internal combustion engine cars! Nixon said, "The 1970's must be the years 
when America pays its debts to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its water, and our 
living environment. It is literally now or never." This quote is taken from a poster created in 
1973 by the Committee to Re-elect the President. 
76. Alexis de Tocqueville noted how Americans flocking to single-issue reforms energized 
the democratic process. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106-07 (Vin-
tage Books 1990) (1840). 
The remarkable diversity of "environmental" issues emphasizes that this "movement" is 
united not by discrete subject matter but by its way of looking at things. See NLS, supra note 
6, at 3. Environmentalism, despite its typical media manifestations, is not just a collection of 
anecdotes, but a systemic analytical approach. The widespread utility of the Rachel Carson 
Paradigm also explains why environmentalism did not fade away as the fad it initially was so 
widely cracked up to be. 
77. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, §§ 1,7,9-20,30 Stat. 1148, 1150-55 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). On the uses of private and public nuisance, see 
NLS, supra note 6, at 102-30. On public trust, see id. at 365-412. On extensions ofthe Refuse 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), see NLS, supra note 6, at 322-27. The critical role played by the 
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tion-notably in the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 
authored by Professor Joseph Sax78-the statutory approach was to facil-
itate citizens' environmental standing in court, and the creation of new 
common law in the public nuisance-public trust areas. 
Then began the parade of regulatory statutes over the next several 
years the like of which we probably will never see again, virtually all 
driven by popular political fervor79-the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969,80 the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (CAA),81 the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,82 the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act,83 the Noise Control Act of 1972,84 the Clean Water Act of 1977 
(CWA),85 the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,86 and more than 
two dozen more.87 In the years that have followed, the scope and 
number of environmental statutes have continued to grow. 
media cannot be underestimated; much of the early media climate, however, was focused on 
environmental lawsuits. 
78. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1970). A number of other states 
adopted this Act as a model. See NLS, supra note 6, at 420-24. This pioneering statute was 
sponsored by a federation of garden clubs in western Michigan, later the West Michigan Envi-
ronmental Action Council. See also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A 
STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1970) for a book that directly inspired citizen environ-
mentalism in the 1970s. 
79. Indeed Congress passed significant federal statutes prior to the late 1960s, including 
most notably the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Park-
lands Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1653(f)(4)(F) (1988), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988); and the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1287 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Each of these, however, was 
relatively adjectival and circumscribed in effective scope and less the product of wide popular 
appeal than the back-chamber pressure from the midcentury remnants of the early conserva-
tion movement, motivated by a rarefied noblesse. This is not to take away from those impor-
tant and dramatic accomplishments, but rather to note that they were less a function of the 
new post-Silent Spring paradigm shifts. 
80. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-
4370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993». 
81. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
82. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 
& Supp. IV 1992». 
83. Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-661c 
(1988». 
84. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 
(1988». 
85. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993». 
86. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
87. By my count there were 34 important environmental statutes passed in the three years 
after NEPA. See ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY TEACHER'S MAN-
UAL 358-60 (1992) (historical statutory appendix). Only Jimmy Carter's years come close, 
with 20 in an equivalent span, many of which were perfecting amendments. Id. at 360-62. 
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These modem statutory systems wittingly or unwittingly reflected 
Rachel Carson's teachings, addressing ecological and economic values 
and problems that had not been acknowledged or had been inadequately 
accounted for in previous public and private law, targeting public as well 
as private enterprises. 
NEP A, which figured in the spotted owl litigation, is a prime exam-
ple. NEPA, whether or not Congress understood what it was doing 
when it passed the bill, reflected the critically important common-sense 
decisional principle that, like individuals, government agencies should 
consider all relevant options and consequences before they acted.88 
The pollution statutes created comprehensive federal standards and 
processes for monitoring and enforcing corporate compliance with 
them-perhaps the most wide-ranging, voluminous, intricately intensive 
regulation of human enterprise in our history.89 Planning statutes have 
attempted to require rational overall programming to guide public and, 
to a much lesser extent, private decision making. Other statutes focusing 
on wildlife and endangered species, workplace health, and particular 
zones of environmental disruption like coastal areas, similarly have at-
tempted to acknowledge systematic problems that previously had not 
been viewed systematically. 
The development of environmental law has been dramatic-a mas-
sive upwelling of layer upon layer of substantial public and private law 
doctrines, almost volcanic in the power and mass of its eruption since the 
early 1960s. 
Today, the extraordinary sweep of subject matter coverage sub-
sumed under the rubric "environmental law" can be attributed to the 
universality of the Carson Paradigm. Consider environmentalism's 
amazing subject matter diversity: It includes chemical wastes buried in 
suburban fields; seal puppies clubbed to death on floating ice packs; ura-
nium fuel rods shipped overseas to nuclear power plants; toxic chemical 
threats to vulnerable neighborhoods in Italy, India, and Georgia; issues 
of environmental justice for low-income neighborhoods and communities 
of color; the imminent extinction of various endangered species; commer-
cialization of national parks; pork-barrel dam building; historical preser-
vation; developing-nation rain forests and desertification; rat bites and 
88. It is likely that Congress did not know what it was doing, see NLS, supra note 6, at 
600-01, but that does not change the importance of its implicit strategy, which has subse-
quently been copied far and wide as a basic construct of rational decision making, id. at 600. 
89. The Internal Revenue Code and regulations, for instance, have less intensive day-to-
day application to industrial production activity and are lesser in bulk than the statutory and 
regulatory provisions of the CAA, CWA, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901·6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). 
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lead poisoning in urban slums; chlorofluorocarbons thinning strato-
spheric ozone; global warming; and hundreds more.90 
All of these widely diverse situations are "environmental" issues, 
and "environmentalists" have taken legal action on each of them-and 
hundreds of others-over the past few decades with varying degrees of 
success.91 Rachel Carson's perceptions of comprehensive intercon-
nectedness in ecological science quite naturally invited a similar compre-
hensive accounting beyond the biophysical sphere of environment-
acknowledging historical, aesthetic, hedonic, spiritual, communitarian, 
ethical, quality-of-life values. These too have become "ecological" values 
in the sense of a larger "human ecology"-as real as and far more wide-
spread than pesticide residues. 
V. THE ARRIVAL OF THE PLURALISTIC PARADIGM 
The 1960s marked a second fortuitous and dramatic shift in para-
digm that launched environmental law: the emphatic arrival of active 
pluralistic participation in the structures of governance. "Never doubt 
that a small group of ... committed citizens can change the world: in-
deed, it's the only thing that ever has," Margaret Mead said;92 and the 
1960s generation took heed. 
The most dramatic expansion of new environmental law, the statu-
tory parade beginning in 1970, would have amounted to very little with-
out the extraordinary advent of effective political pluralism in the mid-
1960s, most obvious in the new openness of the courts to citizen public 
interest litigation. 
In public law litigation the key was that federal courts allowed citi-
zens to hijack the old bipolar administrative law. The structure of proce-
dural constraints on agencies backed by expanded doctrines of judicial 
review-designed by regulated industry over the first half of the century 
to rein in high-handed bureaucracies-was now turned by citizen out sid-
90. See NLS, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
91. Each case involves a highly individualized set of scientific facts, economic and political 
issues, and social and natural consequences. Many have no obvious connection with others on 
the list, other than an environmental label. The different areas have become so voluminously 
complex that an expert working on water pollution law, for example, typically has no time to 
do anything else. A person studying the science and law of endangered plants may have no 
special knowledge of any other environmental area, and no ties to individuals working on other 
kinds of environmental cases. Given this diversity, the term "environmental" may seem use-
lessly broad, describing nothing in particular. At worst, the environmental label can give each 
of these situations a quixotic implication that may serve to detract from serious public consid-
eration of the merits, although this is changing. But the Carson Paradigm links them al1. 
92. Barbara Dority, Civil Liberties Watch: Compassion in Dying, THE HUMANIST, July-
Aug. 1993, at 25, 26 (quoting Margaret Mead). 
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ers against the industry-agency establishment itself. Circuit court deci-
sions like Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission 93 in 1966 led to Supreme Court cases like Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe in 197I.94 These cases established the 
standing of citizens to demand the same access to agencies and courts, 
and the same procedural treatment, as the more established "legitimate" 
bipolar players. 
Even more, the courts showed a willingness to give citizens ex-
panded recognition as "private attorneys general" attempting to enforce 
federal law when the official players would not-and when indeed they 
were often the defendants. As Warren Burger, no bleeding-heart liberal, 
wrote in a case in which the agency and industry had built a wall against 
citizen intervention in the administrative process, "[I]ntervenors repre-
senting a public interest [should not] be treated as interlopers .... [A] 
public intervenor is seeking no license or private rights .... The public 
intervenors, who were performing a public service ... were entitled to a 
more hospitable reception in the performance of that function."95 
When citizen environmentalists attempt to vindicate the public in-
terest against well-heeled corporate adversaries, an agency should not 
"act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes ... ; the right of the 
public must receive active and affirmative protection."96 Starting with 
Calvert Cliffs Coordination Committee v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commission,97 NEPA cases epitomized this dramatic takeover. NEPA 
was, remember, a statute addressed to agencies themselves, with textual 
mention of enforcement limited to the President and Congress, and a 
very conscious exclusion of any hint of citizen litigation from its terms.98 
Yet the courts matter-of-factly proceeded to interpret NEP A to create a 
cause of action, and citizens have been its sole practical enforcement. 
93. 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that statute may create new interests and 
rights, thus giving standing). See also Office of Communication of the United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), appeal after remand, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), which was not a traditional environmental case, but felt like one. 
94. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Overton Park was followed by United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
95. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546, 
548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
96. Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 620. 
97. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Calvert Cliffs was perhaps the most dramatic early 
legal showdown between the old industrial-regulatory establishment and the new Carson con-
sciousness employed by citizen groups. 
98. NEPA's legislative history clearly demonstrates congressional intent to exclude the 
spectre of citizen lawsuits. See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 13 (1976); NLS, supra note 6, at 600-01. 
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The pluralist shift was reflected in statutes regulating internal 
agency procedures as well. The Freedom of Information Act99 turned 
official information policy on its head, providing for a presumption of 
disclosure with severely limited exceptions. l°O The government in the 
Sunshine ActIOl sought to open the windows of closed-door meetings 
long dominated by good-ol'-boy inside players. 
But the most significant statutory symptom of the pluralist para-
digm shift was the explosion of congressionally created citizen enforce-
ment provisions. Drawing on the experience of the civil rights era, the 
drafters of dozens of new and amended environmental statutesl02 real-
ized that hopes for reliable enforcement required the efforts of citizen 
attorneys general. In a quintessentially American move-now being cop-
ied by European and other international legal systems103-these statutes 
gave citizens standing to enforce federal law upon filing a sixty-day no-
tice letter.l04 Fee-shifting provisions further encouraged citizen enforce-
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
100. Id. § 552 (1988). Prior law reflected the bipolar Establishment position; requested in-
formation was presumed not to be disclosed. 
101. Id. § 552b. The Sunshine Act has been underwhelming in its effectiveness. See FCC 
v. lIT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463, 473 (1984). 
102. See. e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1988); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
sources Act, id. § 1427(c); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West 1986); 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1988); 
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, id. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) 
(1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, id. § 4911(d); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, id. 
§ 5851(e)(2); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, id. § 6305(d) (1988); Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 
7607(f) (West 1988 & Supp. III 1991); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 
U.S.C. § 8435(d) (1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, id. § 9124(d); Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1988); see a/so MARY DERFNER & AR-
THUR WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES (1983). 
103. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration reads: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appro-
priate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public au-
thorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States 
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making informa-
tion widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, in-
cluding redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
Rio Declaration, supra note 73, princ. 10. 
104. Statutory standing, of course, is subject to some further Article III and court-made 
strictures that have hindered the citizen enforcement process. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? O/Citizen Suits. "Injuries." and Article III, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 163 (1992). 
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ment by allowing citizen plaintiffs who prevailed in whole or part to 
recover expert witness and attorneys fees. lOS 
The rationale for encouraging citizen enforcement litigation, 
though obvious, deserves spelling out. It reflects the conjunction of the 
two paradigms. Public policy had evolved to recognize values and deci-
sional contexts that obstructed or overturned preexisting institutional 
norms. To rely on the existing bipolar institutions for zealous applica-
tion of the new standards and procedures was to ask too much of institu-
tional self-interest and good-ol' -boy human nature. Rachel Carson's 
Paradigm was too threatening to established habits and alliances. Citi-
zen outsiders who understood the new paradigm and were willing to take 
on the burdens of volunteer pluralism were a structural necessity if re-
form was to be brought into the system over the passive or active resist-
ance of the old insiders. As in the Forest Service clear-cutting cases, if 
citizens did not enforce the law, no one would. 
Citizen litigation shaped most of the modem administrative struc-
ture of environmental law every step of the way, from NEPA as a tangi-
ble procedural requirement to the most intricate question of how air 
pollution offset credits can be brokered in interstate transfers, in' a vast 
swath of law-building. 106 Citizen environmentalists have evolved a re-
markable range of pluralistic organizations, many with marked sophisti-
cation in science, policy analysis, communication, and politics, as well as 
legal skills. With so much environmental law on the books and so many 
environmental practitioners in the modem bar,107 environmental law and 
environmentalism will never again be marginal. 
VI. A SUMMARY PERSPECTIVE 
This Essay argues that environmental law is a special kind of field, 
born on the cusp of a particularly significant moment in American social 
history. Environmental law is not a single issue, not a single area of law. 
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988). The Equal Access to Justice Act added a general 
authorization for fee recovery in successful suits against federal agency defendants. [d.; see 
Reuben B. Robertson & Mary Candace Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Govern-
ment under the Equal Access to Justice Act, S6 TUL. L. REV. 903 (1982). 
106. One cannot understand the legal development of major command and control regula-
tory systems like the Clean Air Act without knowing the role played by NGOs and their 
attorneys, like Natural Resources Defense Council's David Doniger and Rick Ayres. The 
primary exception to the primacy of citizen litigation is probably the field of toxics regulation, 
in which agency initiative has built most of the doctrine not so much in response to citizen 
litigation as to the astonishing and somewhat anomalous popular political revulsion against 
toxic contamination. 
107. By the early 19805 according to the Environmental Law Institute's Bill Futrell, the 
number of attorneys practicing environmental law exceeded the number practicing labor law. 
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It sprang in the 1960s from the confluence of two fundamental societal 
paradigm shifts, two new ways of looking at the world. The Rachel Car-
son Paradigm was a decisional analytical construct charting the basic 
necessity and logic of comprehensive accounting of foreseeable costs and 
benefits, even if they are indirect and unmarketized. The Pluralist Para-
digm of the mid-1960s marked the beginning of a shift from an exclu-
sively bipolar model of governance-in which government agencies were 
entrusted with the task of counter-balancing regulated market forces-to 
a multipolar model with active participation by many interested outsid-
ers. The environmental law pluralism that emerged from the confluence 
of the two is a political process antidote to the fact that the older bipolar 
cost-externalizing social structures, private and public, have massively 
resisted the new wisdom. 
If the proposition advanced in this Essay has merit, it permits sev-
eral interesting analytical extensions that are beyond the limits of this 
present Symposium format. Why in the course of the past twenty-five 
years has environmental law grown so far beyond pure ecology to include 
so many social, economic, political, and technological areas, instead of 
quickly dying out as a single-issue fad as initially predicted? Why has 
environmental law spread its tendrils so ubiquitously throughout the 
legal system, instead of just remaining a cozy green corner of the law 
school curriculum? Why is environmentalism often so erratic, jerry-
built, and confrontational? Why is it that the procedures, structures, and 
players of environmental law so often turn up in other active areas of 
national governance? If pluralism is functionally important, why is it so 
undernourished and resisted? And where do we go from here-toward 
sustainable economics and ecological balance, or not? The proposition of 
shifting paradigms can help answer these questions. 
If the fundamental perceptions of environmentalism are correct-
that human decisions do generally tend to ignore cumulative negative 
consequences, but everything is connected to everything else so we need a 
decisional system that integrates considerations of the whole-then 
much of the development of environmental law over the last several de-
cades becomes in retrospect a laboratory of these paradigms, and a har-
binger of the future. 
